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Abstract
The number of people able to end Earth’s technical civilization has heretofore been
small. Emerging dual-use technologies, such as biotechnology, may give similar power
to thousands or millions of individuals. To quantitatively investigate the ramifica-
tions of such a marked shift on the survival of both terrestrial and extraterrestrial
technical civilizations, this paper presents a two-parameter model for civilizational
lifespans, i.e. the quantity L in Drake’s equation for the number of communicating
extraterrestrial civilizations. One parameter characterizes the population lethality
of a civilization’s biotechnology and the other characterizes the civilization’s psy-
chosociology. L is demonstrated to be less than the inverse of the product of these
two parameters. Using empiric data from PubMed to inform the biotechnology pa-
rameter, the model predicts human civilization’s median survival time as decades
to centuries, even with optimistic psychosociological parameter values, thereby posi-
tioning biotechnology as a proximate threat to human civilization. For an ensemble
of civilizations having some median calculated survival time, the model predicts that,
after 80 times that duration, only one in 1024 civilizations will survive – a tempo and
degree of winnowing compatible with Hanson’s “Great Filter.” Thus, assuming that
civilizations universally develop advanced biotechnology, before they become vigor-
ous interstellar colonizers, the model provides a resolution to the Fermi paradox.
∗Air Division, Joint Forces Headquarters, California National Guard, Sacramento, CA 95826.
The views expressed are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or
position of the California Military Department, the Air Force, the Department of Defense, or the
U.S. Government.
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1 Introduction
In 1961 Drake introduced a multi-parameter equation to estimate the number of civ-
ilizations in the galaxy capable of interstellar communication∗ (Drake 1961). Soon
after, von Hoerner, Shklovskii, and Sagan (von Hoerner 1961) (Shklovskii & Sagan
1966) concluded that the equation’s precision depended principally on its parameter
L – the mean lifetime of a communicating civilization – because L’s value was un-
certain over several orders of magnitude. While subsequent advances in astrophysics
have improved the precision of several parameters in the Drake equation (Burchell
2006) (Frank & Sullivan 2016) (Vakoch & Dowd 2015), L remains highly uncertain
(Oliver & Billingham 1971) (Ambartsumian & Sagan 1973) (Billingham et al. 1979)
(Duncan 1991) (Schenkel 1999) (Kompanichenko 2000) (Rubin 2001) (Forgan 2009)
(Maccone 2010).
The apparent absence of communicating civilizations (Webb 2015) in our planet-
rich galaxy (Cassan et al. 2012) underscores the possibility that such civilizations
have short L (Webb 2015) (Bostrom & Cirkovic 2011), potentially due to factors
exogenous to the civilization (e.g., nearby supernovae) and/or endogenous to the
civilization (e.g., self-destruction).
On Earth, control of endogenous factors that could destroy civilization – namely,
Malthusian resource exhaustion, nuclear weapons, and environmental corruption –
has until now rested with the very few persons who command large nuclear arse-
nals or steer the largest national economies. However, emerging technologies could
change this. For example, biotechnology (President’s Council of Advisors on Science
and Technology 2016) and nanotechnology (Drexler 1987) offer the prospect of self-
replicating elements able to spread autonomously and calamitously worldwide, at low
cost and without heavy industrial machinery. Ultimately, thousands of individuals –
having varying levels of impulse control – could wield such technologies.
Intuition suggests danger rises as potentially civilization-ending technology (“CE
technology”) becomes more widely distributed, but quantitative analyses of this ef-
fect in the context of Drake’s L are rare. At the extreme of technology diffusion,
Cooper (Cooper 2013) modeled an entire population of 1010 individuals (growing at
2% annually), each with a 10−7 annual probability of unleashing a biological agent
causing 50% mortality (with 25% standard deviation). He found a mean span of
L=8000 years before extinction, defined as a population less than 4000.
This article generalizes Cooper’s work. It develops a simple two-parameter math-
∗For brevity, “civilization” in this paper refers to a civilization capable of interstellar commu-
nication, and the “lifespan” or “lifetime” of a civilization is the span of time during which it is able
to communicate. Thus, the “death,” “silencing,” or “ending” of a civilization are synonymous.
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ematical model for L that applies to most scenarios of disseminated CE technology
and is mathematically indifferent to specific CE technologies. For reasons summa-
rized below, however, biotechnology may be regarded as a universal CE technology.
2 Biotechnology’s potential to end civilizations
On Earth, microbial pandemics have ended non-technical civilizations (McNeill 1976).
Antimicrobial drugs mitigate such risks only partially. Advisors to the President of
the United States have already warned that biotechnology’s rapid progress may soon
make possible engineered microorganisms that hold “serious potential for destructive
use by both states and technically-competent individuals with access to modern lab-
oratory facilities” (President’s Council of Advisors on Science and Technology 2016).
Indeed, small research groups engineered proof-of-principle demonstrations years ago
(Jackson et al. 2001) (Herfst et al. 2012) (Imai et al. 2012), while recent history pro-
vides a precedent not only for a laboratory-preserved organism causing a worldwide
pandemic∗ (Wertheim 2010) (Rozo & Gronvall 2015), but also for the organism’s de-
scendants circulating for 30 years in the global population (Zimmer & Burke 2009).
Looking forward, medical research initiatives such as the Cancer Moonshot (National
Cancer Institute 2018) may, if successful, seed thousands of hospitals with exquisitely
targetable cell-killing biotechnology that could, in principle, be adapted and aimed
at any genetically defined target, not just cancer cells.
Any technically-capable intelligence produced by evolution likely shares this sus-
ceptibility. “Genetic” processes, defined here as those that pass information to build
a succeeding generation or direct the self’s use of sustaining energy, are required
for evolution (Farnsworth et al. 2013). Assuming that no process can be perfect,
imperfections in genetic processes equate to “genetic diseases,” and will spur any
intelligence having self-preservation drives to develop genetic manipulation technol-
ogy to ameliorate those diseases. Given this motivation to alter genetic processes,
plus the biological certainty that genetic processes respond to environmental inputs
(e.g. food shortages), plus a general technical capacity to control environments ever
more precisely, the eventual appearance of biotechnology may be expected. Cooper
(Cooper 2013) expects that civilizations will typically develop biotechnology and
spaceflight approximately simultaneously.
Biotechnology is inescapably threatening because it is inherently dual-use (Wat-
son et al. 2018): curing genetic disease enables causing genetic disease. Cooper
(Cooper 2013) uses Cohen’s theorem (Cohen 1987) to assert that, under any reason-
∗This pandemic miserably sickened the author in early 1978.
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able model of computing (applied here to bio-molecular computing), no algorithm
(“medical treatment”) can stop every possible piece of invasive self-replicating soft-
ware. Whether Cohen’s theorem strictly applies or not, the truism that defensive
technology generally lags offensive is relevant.
Of course, any civilization can walk away from any technology. But, because other
widely available technologies with civilization-ending potential, e.g., nanotechnology,
lack the a priori universal desirability of biotechnology, only biotechnology will herein
be further discussed.
3 Model and Results
The baseline model assumes that all communicating technical civilizations either
continue communicating forever, or go silent involuntarily due to some action arising
within each civilization. Two parameters model the lifespan of such civilizations: E,
the number of entities (individuals, coalitions, nation-states, etc.) in the civilization
who control a means to end civilization (i.e., render it uncommunicative), and P , the
uniform probability per annum per entity that an entity will trigger its civilization-
ending means. Entities act independently, and civilization is assumed to end with
the first trigger.
The simplest model for the probability, C(y), that the civilization will still be
communicative after y years, under constant E and P , is:
C(y) = (1− P )(Ey) (1)
Solving Equation 1 for y:
y =
ln C(y)
E ln(1− P ) (2)
Borrowing the abbreviation LD50 from pharmacology, where it indicates the me-
dian lethal dose of a substance, it is here re-conceptualized as “lethal duration 50”
to indicate the number of years, under a given E and P , before civilization’s ac-
cumulated probability of being uncommunicative, 1 − C(y), is 50%. Substituting
C(y) = 1− 0.50 into Equation 2 yields:
LD50 =
ln(1− .50)
E ln(1− P ) (3)
Similarly, the number of years before civilization has a 5% chance of becoming
uncommunicative is:
4
LD05 =
ln(1− .05)
E ln(1− P ) ≈ (0.074 LD50) ≈
LD50
13.5
Increasing the certainty of civilizational death increases the lethal duration exponen-
tially, as Figure 1 shows. Thus, for any E and P , LD95 ≈ (4.3 LD50), LD99.9999 ≈
(20 LD50), and LD100[1−C(y)] ≈ (80 LD50) where C(y) = 10−24.
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Time, t, (in multiples of LD50)
0
20
40
60
80
100
%
 o
f 
C
iv
ili
za
ti
o
n
s 
N
o
t 
C
o
m
m
u
n
ic
a
ti
n
g
, 
1
0
0
(1
-C
(t
))
  LD05
  LD50
  LD90
  LD95
  LD99
Civilization Silencing Curve
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80
Time, t, in multiples of LD50
100
10−3
10−6
10−9
10−12
10−15
10−18
10−21
10−24F
ra
ct
io
n
 o
f 
C
iv
ili
za
ti
o
n
s 
S
ti
ll 
C
o
m
m
u
n
ic
a
ti
n
g
 =
 C
(t
)
 LD50
 LD99
 LD99.9999
 LD99.9999999
 LD99.9999999999
Civilization Survival Curve
Figure 1: Survival times in a cohort of civilizations, all created at t = 0.
Left: Over time, the percentage of silent civilizations, 100(1−C(t)), logarithmically
approaches 100%. For any E and P , LDX% =
ln(1−X#)
ln(1−0.50)LD50, where X% is a per-
centage and X# is the equivalent probability. Right: This panel modifies the left
panel’s axes. First, the time axis is expanded compared to the left. Second, the
vertical axis has been inverted to show survival, C(t), over time. The LD50 and
LD99 points carry over from the left panel. Remarkably, the time required to reach
infinitesimal survival rates, e.g., 10−24, is less than two orders of magnitude larger
than the median civilizational survival time, LD50.
Figure 2 plots the relationship between E and LD50 for several P , and illustrates
the approximation LD50 ≈ 0.7/(E × P ), derived in Equation A3 of the Mathematical
Appendix.
To calculate the mean lifespan, it is more intuitive to first calculate the number of
communicating civilizations, N(w), that exist at the end of a time window extending
from year y = 0 to y = w. Assuming that zero civilizations existed at y = 0, and that
communicating civilizations were born at a constant rate of B per year throughout
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Figure 2: Technology diffusion (E) and psychosociology (P ) determine civi-
lizational lifespan (LD50). E is the number of entities who control a means to end
civilization. P is the probability per annum per entity that the entity will trigger its
civilization-ending means. Given a constant E and P , LD50 is the median number
of years before civilization is expected to end. E and LD50 have an inverse linear
relationship for any P .
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the time window, the Mathematical Appendix shows:
N(w) = B
∫ w
0
C(y) dy (is A5)
= B
Sw − 1
ln S
where S = (1− P )E (is A8)
≈ B
EP
[
for w ≥ 10
EP
and small P
]
(is A10)
Figure 3 plots the exact form of N(w) from Equation A8, for multiple w and EP
when B = 1. It shows with reasonable precision that N(w) ≤ B/(EP ) for any w.
The parameter L in the Drake equation is reformulated herein to L(w), the mean
lifespan for civilizations born during a time window of duration w. This transforms
the Drake equation to:
N(w) = B L(w) (is A12)
Thus, L(w) = N(w) when B = 1, and so Figure 3 is also a plot of L(w).
Per Figure 3, L(w) increases with w. However, its maximum value, at any time,
is constrained. Assuming all civilizations have identical E and identical P :
L(w)max <
1
EP
[for all w] (is A15)
Combining these two formulae and defining N as “N(w) for all w” yields the
Drake equation as an inequality:
N <
B
EP
(4)
or, hewing to its classical form (Drake 1961):
N <
R∗fpneflfifc
EP
(5)
Because the model addresses only endogenous involuntary silencings, adding consid-
eration of other causes for silencings would merely reinforce this inequality.
To produce near-term risk estimates for Earth, a PubMed search informed the
value of E, as follows. With the assumption of a civilization-ending technology based
7
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Figure 3: Civilizations and time. For six different values of E × P , the plot
shows two equivalent quantities for time windows of various durations w: (a) L(w)
= mean lifetime of communicating civilizations over time, and (b) N(w) = number of
communicating civilizations over time when B = 1. For both quantities, a constant
B is assumed. Zero civilizations exist at time w = 0. Equation A15 mandates
L(w) < 1/(EP ) for all w. Per Equation A9, L(w) grows substantially until a near-
steady-state is reached at about w = 10/(EP ) years. An arbitrary-precision software
package (Johansson et al. 2014) used Equation A8 to calculate N(w) and L(w).
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on some yet-to-be-described genetic technique, the number of people authoring scien-
tific articles indexed under “genetic techniques” (one of PubMed’s ≈27,000 standard
index terms) can be used to estimate the number of people capable of exploiting such
a technique, thereby serving as a proxy for E. Thus, the PubMed search
genetic techniques[mh] AND "2008/01/01"[PDAT]:"2015/12/31"[PDAT]
performed on August 10, 2017, yielded 594,458 publications in the most recent eight-
year span of complete bibliographic coverage. After eliminating non-scientific pub-
lications (of type letter, comment, news, interview, etc.) 585,004 remained, which
carried 1,555,661 unique author names. Of these authors, approximately 179,765
appeared on five or more publications. This number is a maximum because some
authors publish under more than one name.
Models employing non-constant E and P are possible. The simplest posits that
E grows as population might: a fixed percent per year. If, over y years, E grows this
way from some initial value E0, with the growth continuously compounded, then:
Ey = E0 e
ry (6)
where r is the growth factor (e.g. 0.02 for 2% annual growth) and e = 2.71828....
Unfortunately, the unbounded exponential term renders this “growth model” non-
sensical for even moderately large y. Still, some insights can emerge for short time
horizons, as detailed in Figure 4, which is based on Equation A18 in the Appendix.
Unsurprisingly, a growing E yields an LD50 significantly smaller than is calculated
from a constant E.
4 Discussion of Model
Unless explicitly noted, all discussion refers to the baseline model in which E is
constant.
Equation 1 provides the probability, C(y), that a civilization survives endogenous
involuntary silencing threats until some L = y. The lethal durations, LD50 et al, are
probabilistic statements of this L. Because the model terminates upon the first use
of a civilization-ending technology, more complicated models, such as the Poisson
distribution, are not required.
Thus, the model is simple, but not unreasonably so. With only two parameters,
however, it is important to understand their inherent assumptions.
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Figure 4: Drop in LD50 when E grows. The horizontal axis corresponds to LD50
values calculated from Equation 3 and a constant E and P . If, however, E is not
constant, and instead grows at a fixed percentage annually (five growth rates are
shown), then LD50 shrinks to the corresponding value on the vertical axis, according
to Equation A19. So, for example, an LD50 of 600 years derived from Figure 2
would be revised to approximately 190 years if E grew by 1% annually. To signal
wariness about exponential explosion, each solid line changes to a dotted line when
the number of entities has increased a million-fold (i.e., Ey/E0 ≥ 106).
Model Discussion: E and P (and B)
In broad terms, E characterizes a CE technology and its availability, while P char-
acterizes the psychology and sociology of the entities who possess the technology.
Although loss of interstellar communicativeness is equated to the end of civilization,
other endpoints (e.g., complete extinction) could be substituted. The only criteria
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are consistency of the endpoint, independence of the entities, and termination of the
model upon first triggering.
Numerous subtleties attend the definitions of E and P .
First, E applies to any CE technology, be it nuclear, nano-, bio-, or another. The
CE technology never fails to end civilization once triggered. The effects of “near
miss” extinction events on population and psychology are ignored.
Second, E includes only entities that possess (or can acquire) the “full stack” of
CE technology. That is, they must have the capability to make or otherwise obtain
the weapon, and to deliver it in quantities that render the civilization uncommunica-
tive. So, for example, even though designs for nuclear weapons are comparatively
well known (Phillips 1978), E for Earth remains only ≈ 2 (representing the leaders
of the United States and Russia).∗ The self-propagating nature of biological weapons
would simplify, but not eliminate, the delivery challenge.
Third, to the extent that machine intelligences possess CE technology, they could
also be counted in E. (Exemplar: “SkyNet” from the Terminator movies.)
Fourth, E reflects a balance between offensive and defensive technologies. Thus,
developing and readying defensive technology offers a straightforward, albeit chal-
lenging, path to markedly decrease E.
Fifth, P is the sum across all reasons, intended or not, that an entity might trigger
the CE technology. Most are psychosocial, e.g., greed, hate, stupidity, folly, gullibility,
power-lust, mental illness, ineptitude, non-fail-safe design, etc. The Bulletin of the
Atomic Scientists’ “doomsday clock” (Anonymous 2002) has similarities to P .
Sixth, the model assumes constant E and P throughout the time window of inter-
est. This is unlikely to occur in a real civilization, given the dynamics of offensive/de-
fensive technologies, population, sociopolitical stability, and technology diffusion.
Simple model extensions would have E and P vary over time, or sum across sub-
populations of entities each with their own Ei and Pi, or sum across multiple CE
technologies each with their own Ej and Pj.
†
Unlike Cooper (Cooper 2013) population growth – and concomitant growth in
E – is omitted from the baseline model because all realistic non-zero growth rates
become nonsensical when compounded (exponentiated) over eons. Over short time
frames, the effect of a growing E can be reasonably equated to a speed-up in time. For
example, when E is constant and the model reaches some state at year y, a situation
in which E is growing by 2% annually will attain the same state significantly earlier,
∗E would be slightly higher if additional other leaders could end civilization via climate change.
†The model would become complex to the extent that interaction terms would be needed to
model a single entity having access to multiple CE technologies. However, modeling the technologies
separately and then choosing the most pessimistic outcome would likely suffice.
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at year 50 ln (1 + y/50) according to Equation A19.
The model’s flexibility could be improved – at the cost of great mathematical
complexity – by assigning probability distributions to E and P and convolving them.
However, models that assume a distribution around some mean value for P (denoted
Pmean) will yield lower values for C(y) and LD50 than the present model, because of
the positive exponent in the definition of C(y). Thus, this model’s dispiritingly low
values for LD50 nevertheless represent a civilization’s best-case outcome for a given
Pmean.
This is most obviously appreciated in the edge case where a single entity has its
P = 1, for example, an entity who acquires the skills of a CE technology specifically
to end civilization. As soon as a single qualified entity has P = 1, then the overall
civilizational P is also 1, and LD50 (in fact, all LDx) is zero.
Civilizations spanning multiple planets should be treated as multiple civilizations,
each modeled separately with their own E and P . Modeling them as a single civi-
lization assumes all the planets’ civilizations die from one attack – an unnecessarily
stringent requirement. Of course, P might change on planets that see a sister planet
destroy itself.
Although colonization would imply a non-constant B, the model would still apply
so long as B is less than some constant Bmax. Using Bmax in the model would provide
an upper bound for N(w). Geometrically increasing B would require re-working the
model, but the barrenness of the galaxy mitigates this possibility: Tipler (Tipler
1980) and others (Webb 2015) (Jones 1981) (Armstrong & Sandberg 2013) note that
a single civilization colonizing at even moderate rates of geometric increase would
fill the galaxy in only a few million years, and we do not observe a full galaxy.
Furthermore, assuming that the technology of interstellar colonization is far more
daunting than biotechnology, and that the self-preservation drives of individual in-
telligences far exceed any elective desire to migrate off-planet, it is reasonable to
expect that, as a rule, civilizations will develop and use sophisticated biotechnology
before dispersing themselves on other planets (Cooper 2013). Thus, the experience
of 20th century Earth is likely typical, i.e., the progress of medicine and public health
in the era antedating genetic biotechnology creates a population explosion, so that
civilization consists of a large, dense, mobile population on a single home world at
the time that potentially CE biotechnology is developed. Because such ecological
conditions are conducive to the spread of communicable agents, it is reasonable to
hypothesize that all planetary civilizations will face existential threats from conta-
gious micro-organisms – whether engineered or not – before they become vigorous
interstellar colonizers (Cooper 2013).
The model could also apply to civilizations based on networked machine intelli-
12
gences when epidemic malware is a possibility. Because diversity among evolution-
produced organisms would likely be higher than among designed software, building
CE technology against machine intelligences could be comparatively easy.
Model Discussion: Stability
It may be argued that a potential CE technology cannot exist for long time spans
without a defensive technology being developed, i.e., that E cannot exceed zero for
thousands, millions, or billions of years.
Several considerations weaken this proposition, especially as relates to biotech-
nology. These considerations are illustrative, and necessarily speculative. Future
biotechnological progress will elucidate the extent to which they hold.
First, reliance on a single CE technology is not required. Instead, multiple CE
technologies may exist serially, each enabling a multitude of different attacks, with
each attack requiring a different defense. This is akin to the inventory of “zero day
exploits” that present-day entities accumulate to penetrate computer systems.
Second, a long period of E > 0 can be viewed as the concatenation of shorter time
periods having Ei > 0, where each Ei derives from a separate CE attack possibility
that is eventually countered by a defense tailored to that attack. For example, if the
frailties of life allow for a million different attacks,∗ and it takes one year to tailor
a defensive technology for each, then E > 0 for w = 106 years. If no periods of
E = 0 were interspersed between the Ei > 0 periods, then the time window w would
equal elapsed time in the universe. In scenarios having interspersed Ei = 0 periods,
elapsed time would exceed window duration.
Third, mere development of defensive technology is not sufficient. The technology
must be fully fielded. That is, unless widespread pre-exposure vaccination is possible,
an attack must be detected, the agent(s) characterized, and the remedy developed,
tested, manufactured (perhaps in billions of doses), distributed, and administered –
all of which must succeed before the attack can take root in the population. This
is a formidable challenge requiring multiple sub-technologies in the near term, or a
single future technology that is currently indistinguishable from magic.
Fourth, defensive technology may be impossible on first principles. For example,
every known life form adapts its gene expression to its environment. An offensive
∗Even simple viruses have profound combinatorial reserve. Influenza A, for example, with its
genome of ≈14,000 nucleotides, has ≈880 million combinatorial two-nucleotide variants and ≈12
trillion three-nucleotide variants (Perelson et al. 2012). Though only a sliver of these would yield
functionally and/or immunologically distinct viruses, the numerator explodes exponentially. It is a
tall order to devise anti-influenza A technologies that are 100% effective against all possible variants.
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technology whose only defense necessitated extinguishing this genetic responsiveness
would seem unobtainable.
Fifth, mere possession of defensive technology is not sufficient – timely and correct
decisions to activate defenses on a civilizational scale must also occur. Thus, a
civilization’s decision-making process, be it political, machine-based, or other, is
also a target for CE technologies. This means E has a small psychosociological
component.∗ Decentralized decision-making, such that every individual intelligence
possessed counter-CE technology and independently decided when and if to self-
medicate, would require a level of trust in the population that no government on
earth has so far developed.
Sixth, generalizing the above scenario, CE technologies need not be highly lethal.
To sustain itself, a densely populated world may rely on critical infrastructure and/or
heavily optimized industrial processes. Direct or indirect disruption of these essential
functions could cause sufficient social chaos to render a civilization uncommunicative.
Finally, if EP is large throughout the universe, then the model does not have to
apply for millions or billions of years. For example, if E = 103 and P = 10−3 then
LD50 ≈ 0.7 years and the probability of surviving to 25 years is < 10−9.
5 Discussion of Results
Results Discussion: Earth
From Equation A3, achieving LD50 ≥ 1000 years requires EP ≤ 7 × 10−4. Thus,
with E = 2 today, P ≤ .00035 is required.
Given the pace of biotechnology’s progress, plus the irresistible pressure to con-
tinue that progress for universally-desired medical purposes, plus the dual-use poten-
tial of the technology, plus its potential worldwide reach, many humans could soon
have the capacity to end Earth’s technical civilization, driving E  2. In a recent
eight-year span, more than 1.5 million people participated in the “genetic techniques”
enterprise at a level sufficient to warrant authorship on a scientific article. Almost
180,000 of them authored five or more such articles. The number actually engineer-
ing artificial organisms today is certainly far smaller, but clearly a large reservoir of
hands-on molecular genetics competence already exists on Earth.
Although LD50 has been our focus, planning with lower thresholds (Suskind
2006), e.g., LD05 (≈ LD50/13.5) or LD01 (≈ LD50/70), would mitigate unanticipated
rapid rises in E or P . For example, comparing a CE technology’s LD01 to the
∗Alternatively, the model could divide P into Poffense and Pdefense.
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anticipated time needed to develop defensive counter-technology might drive policy
makers to speed such development.
Given the PubMed authorship numbers, a few new biotechnological innovations
could reasonably and quickly raise E to 104. If so, and P = 10−7, then LD01 ≈ 10
years. If E became larger, LD01 would become smaller. The short LD01 time span is
concerning, given today’s comparatively slow pace of antimicrobial innovation (the
common cold and many other infections remain incurable and without vaccinations),
and strongly argues that defensive technology development must be expanded and
must occur simultaneously with any therapeutic (offensive) development.
An especially concerning scenario arises if, someday, hospitals employ people who
routinely write patient-specific molecular-genetic programs and package them into
replicating viruses that are therapeutically administered to patients, especially cancer
patients. If the world attained the European Union’s per capita hospital density,∗
this could mean two hundred thousand hospitals employing perhaps 1 million people
who might genetically engineer viruses every workday. Should techniques emerge
for a highly communicable therapeutic virus – against which vaccination would be
refused, as that would preclude future cancer therapy – and E reached 106, then
attaining an LD01 of just 10 years would require P < 10
−9, perhaps an impossibility,
given human nature.
Results Discussion: Drake Equation
By simulating an ensemble of civilizations, the present model challenges Burchell’s
assertion (Burchell 2006) that L in the Drake equation is “not truly estimable [es-
timatable] without observation of a set of societies.” Although estimating P based
on first principles cannot be done for extraterrestrial civilizations, estimating E and
the product EP may be tractable within the assumptions of the model, as follows.
Lower-bound estimates for E would derive from deep understanding of the genetic
mechanisms of life – all possible mechanisms, not just DNA/RNA – and from the
possibilities of biotechnology as applied to those mechanisms. Thus, estimates of E
would derive from understanding the gamut of intelligence-compatible biologies, an
understanding that smart human biochemists could perhaps achieve ex nihilo, with-
out interstellar travel or communication. Machine intelligences would have analogous
considerations. The existence of other CE technologies might increase E further.
Because of Equation 4, EP can be constrained by searching for extraterrestrial
∗In 2004, 15,000 hospitals (European Hospital and Healthcare Federation 2009) were serving
500 million people (Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development / European Union
2016). Likely, few emerging health systems will follow an American model.
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intelligence (SETI). With B increasingly well understood, constraining N in Equa-
tion 4 constrains EP . Thus, if SETI efforts someday yielded a conclusion such as “We
estimate that no more than Nx communicating civilizations exist,” then EP < B/Nx.
If both EP and E can be estimated, then the value of P is constrained. It is
interesting to note that, given its dependence on psychological factors, possessing a
constraint or estimate of P would be a first step toward a quantitative epidemiology
of alien psychologies.
The model applies so long as opportunities to deploy civilization-ending means
predate the ability to counter all such attacks (and accidents). That is, whenever
E > 0, Equation 3 produces a finite value for LD50 and civilization is at risk,
assuming P > 0. Whether any measures could achieve P = 0, short of pervasive and
perfect surveillance of entities, is unknown.
The model’s low values for lifespan, L(w), have implications for SETI strategy.
If geometrically increasing interstellar colonization circumvents short civilizational
lifespan, then, all other factors being equal, communicating civilizations would be
longest-lived where such colonization is easiest, e.g. where the time and/or energy
required to move between habitable planets is smallest. This consideration adds to
existing reasons why SETI might target zones of densely collected habitable planets
(Turnbull & Tarter 2003).
Results Discussion: the Fermi Paradox and the Great Filter
To date, in a visible universe of ≈ 1024 stars and their planets, only Earth shows
evidence of intelligent life. This apparent paradox, noted by Enrico Fermi and others
(Webb 2015), could be explained by a “Great Filter” that all but prevents commu-
nicating civilizations from forming or surviving (Hanson n.d.). The Great Filter
may be technological in origin if “(a) virtually all sufficiently advanced civilizations
eventually discover it and (b) its discovery leads almost universally to existential
disaster” (Bostrom 2008).
Most remarkably, the present model supplies the quantitative 24 orders-of-magnitude
winnowing required of a Great Filter, reducing it to a two-orders-of-magnitude mul-
tiplication. For example, if E = 106 and (optimistically) P = 10−9, then LD50 ≈ 700
years, and LD100[1−C(y)] ≈ (80 LD50) ≈ 56, 000 years when C(y) = 10−24. That is,
for this E and P , we expect only one civilization in 1024 to still be communicating
after 56,000 years, and even a galactically-short 100,000-year lifespan is effectively
impossible because only one in 1042 civilizations remains communicative.
Overall, therefore, I would advise advanced technical civilizations to optimize
not on megascale computation (Sandberg et al. 2017) nor engineering (Dyson 1960)
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nor energetics (Kardashev 1964), but on defense from individually-possessable self-
replicating existential threats, such as microbes or nanomachines.
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Mathematical Appendix
Math 1: ln(1− P ) = −P as P → 0
To solve
f(P ) =
ln(1− P )
P
at P = 0, we observe that f(0) evaluates to 0/0, making the expression indetermi-
nate. However, it also means L’Hoˆpital’s rule applies in the second step below:
lim
P→0
f(P ) = lim
P→0
ln(1− P )
P
=
lim
P→0
d[ ln(1−P ) ]
dP
lim
P→0
d[ P ]
dP
=
lim
P→0
( −1
1−P )
lim
P→0
(1)
=
−1
1
Hence:
lim
P→0
ln(1− P )
P
= −1
So, when P → 0 we can use:
ln(1− P ) = −P (A1)
For our purposes this approximation is excellent, viz. ln(1 − 0.1) = −0.105 and
ln(1− 0.001) = −0.0010005.
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Math 2: LD50 as P → 0
We start with Equation 3 defining LD50, then simultaneously take the limit and
substitute Equation A1 into it:
LD50 =
ln(1− .50)
E × ln (1− P )
lim
P→0
LD50 =
ln(1− .50)
E × (−P )
=
ln 2
E × P (A2)
≈ 0.7
E × P (A3)
Thinking solely in terms of exponents:
LD50 ≈ .7× 10−(log10E + log10P )
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Math 3: N(w) – Exact
Recall from Equation 1 that C(y) is the fraction of civilizations still communicating
y years after their birth. Here, however, the notion of time changes a bit.
First, define:
B(y) = number of new civilizations born in year y
N(y) = number of communicating civilizations existing in year y
Next, assume we are interested in a window of time in the galaxy’s history running
from year 0 to year w, where no civilizations were present at y = 0. We want to
know the number of communicating civilizations that exist at the end of the window,
i.e. at time w.
To be considered alive at year w, any civilization born in some year y will have
to communicate for w − y more years. Thus:
N(w) = B(0) C(w) + B(1) C(w − 1) + B(2) C(w − 2) + ... + B(w) C(0)
Assuming B(y) is a constant (having units: civ year−1):
N(w) = B
w∑
y=0
C(y) (A4)
We can replace summation with integration:
N(w) = B
∫ w
0
C(y) dy (A5)
To solve for N(w), assuming all civilizations have the same E and P , we define:
S = (1− P )E (A6)
Substituting the above into Equation 1 yields:
C(y) = Sy (A7)
Then substituting Equation A7 into Equation A5:
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N(w) = B
∫ w
0
Sy dy
= B
Sy
ln S
∣∣∣∣w
0
= B
(
Sw
ln S
− S
0
ln S
)
This yields the exact form of N(w):
N(w) = B
Sw − 1
ln S
where S = (1− P )E (A8)
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Math 4: N(w) – As P → 0 and w →∞
In many scenarios for N(w), P → 0 and/or w →∞. We here derive an approxima-
tion for such conditions.
First, expand the exact definition of N(w) in Equation A8:
N(w) = B
((1− P )E)w − 1
ln ((1− P )E)
= B
(1− P )(Ew) − 1
E ln (1− P )
Now substitute with the results of Equation A1, namely ln(1 − P ) = −P when
P is small and, consequently, (1− P ) = e−P :
lim
P→0
N(w) = B
e−PEw − 1
E (−P )
= B
1− e−PEw
EP
As w becomes large, e−PEw → 0. Thus:
lim
P→0
w→∞
N(w) =
B
EP
(A9)
Using Figure 3, which was calculated using the exact form of N(w) in Equa-
tion A8, we observe the approximate value-range of w for which the limit of Equa-
tion A9 holds:
N(w) ≈ B
EP
[
for w ≥ 10
EP
and small P
]
(A10)
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Math 5: L(w)
As many others have noted, the Drake equation can be reduced to a two-parameter
form:
N = B × L (A11)
where N is the number of communicating civilizations, B is the birth rate of com-
municating civilizations, and L is the mean lifetime of all birthed civilizations.
Applying this to our approach of examining time windows having constant B, we
can rewrite Equation A11 as:
N(w) = B × L(w) (A12)
where L(w) is the mean lifetime of a civilization born during the time window that
extends from 0 to w.
Rearranging Equation A12 and then substituting from Equation A8 yields:
L(w) =
1
B
N(w)
=
1
B
B
Sw − 1
ln S
=
Sw − 1
ln S
(A13)
=
(1− P )Ew − 1
ln (1− P )E
To derive a simple approximation for L(w), recall from Equation A10 that N(w) ≈
B/(EP ). It is immediately apparent from Equation A12 that:
L(w) ≈ 1
EP
[
for w ≥ 10
EP
and small P
]
(A14)
Finally, the ratio of Equation A2 to Equation A14 is noteworthy:
LD50 / L(w) ≈ ln 2 ≈ 0.7
[
for w ≥ 10
EP
and small P
]
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Math 6: Maximum L(w)
To find the w where L(w) is maximal, we set the derivative of the definition of L(w)
(from Equation A13) to zero:
0 =
d[S
w−1
ln S
]
dw
=
1
ln S
Sw ln S
= Sw
Given 0 < S < 1, then Sw = 0 at w =∞. So, using Equations A13 and A1:
L(w)max = L(∞) =
S∞ − 1
ln S
=
−1
E ln(1− P )
=
1
EP
as P → 0
Seeking to show L(w)max < 1/(EP ) for all P , we begin by observing:
x− 1
2
x2 +
1
3
x3... < x [for x < 0]
The Mercator series is:
x− 1
2
x2 +
1
3
x3... = ln (1 + x) [for − 1 < x ≤ 1]
We combine the two preceding formulae into an inequality, then set x = −P :
ln (1 + x) < x [for − 1 < x < 0]
ln (1− P ) < −P [for − 1 < −P < 0]
Substituting back into the definitions of L(w)max gives, for 0 < P < 1:
L(w)max = L(∞) =
−1
E ln(1− P ) =
(
lim
P→0
1
EP
)
<
1
EP
(A15)
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Math 7: Model of E Growing Over Time
We wish to model E growing over time and apply the model to time spans that do
not cause exponential explosion.
First, recall Equation 1, the basis for the baseline “Constant-E” model:
C(y) = (1− P )(Ey) (1)
The exponential term Ey has units entity-years, and signifies the total exposure of
the civilization to destruction events. Renaming E to E0 to reinforce its constant
nature in the Constant-E model, we can write:
Exposure[ConstantModel]y = E0 y (A16)
Similarly, we can calculate exposure for a model in which E grows with time. Equa-
tion 6 defined Ey as growing from an initial value of E0 at an annual rate of r over
a period of y years, with the growth continuously compounded:
Ey = E0 e
ry (6)
In this “Growing-E” model, the civilization’s exposure to destruction events is:
Exposure[GrowthModel]y =
∫ y
t=0
E0 e
rt dt
= E0
(
ert
r
∣∣∣∣y
t=0
)
= E0
ery − 1
r
(A17)
We can equate the two exposures from the right-hand-sides of Equations A16 and
A17, taking care to distinguish the two different y:
E0 y1 = E0
ery2 − 1
r
This equation says that a civilization’s destruction-exposure after y1 years as calcu-
lated by the constant model, equals the exposure after y2 years as calculated by the
growth model.
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Continuing, we can cancel the E0 terms and express y2 in terms of y1:
y1 =
ery2 − 1
r
y2 =
ln (1 + ry1)
r
(A18)
Analytically, Equation A18 provides a shortcut for converting results from the constant-
E model to the growing-E model. For example, we can define the LD50 for the
growing-E model as:
LD50[G] =
ln (1 + r LD50[C])
r
(A19)
where the [G] and [C] indicate the growing-E model and constant-E model, respec-
tively. See Figure 4.
Although Equation A18 does not have an explicit exponential term, it must still be
applied carefully because it implicitly assumes that the number of entities can grow
exponentially without limit, per Equation 6. Alternative growing-E models may be
derived, e.g. using linear growth.
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